Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1952

R. M. Scoville v. Kellogg Sales Company :
Appellant's Reply Brief
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
E. R. Callister, Jr.; Reese C. Anderson; Attorneys for Appellant;
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Scoville v. Kellogg Sales Co., No. 7824 (Utah Supreme Court, 1952).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1728

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

R. M. SCOVILLE,
Appellant,

Case No.

-vs.-

7824

· KELLO·GG SALES COMPANY,
Respondent.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

FILE·D
r--g
-R.

CALLISTER, JR.
REESE C. ANDERSON
-·------------------------- -- ......... _. ......
~lerk, Supreme Cot!r Attorneys for Appellwnt
1- t.

._r.-

2v

,__

E.

L v.J

'

···~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
PRELil\iiN ARY STATEMENT ................................................

1-2

STATEMENT OF POINTS --································--·-------------------

2

ARGUMENT
POINT 1 - WHERE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUBSTANTIATE A VERDICT
THAT TIMELY OBJECTION WAS MADE TO AN
ACCOUNT AND THE REBUTTAL OF ANY PRESUMPTION OF ACCURACY OF AN ACCOUNT
IT WAS ERROR· TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR
A PARTY RELYING ON AN ACCOUNT STATED AS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTION ON A CONTRACT --------------------------~----------------------------------------------------- 3-12
POINT 2 - WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENC;E
THAT PAYMENT OF AN AMOUNT ADMITTED
TO BE DUE WAS MADE UPON THE CONDITION
THAT ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH PAYMENT
SHOULD BE IN FULL SATISFACTION OF ALL
CLAIMS, IT WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE PARTY RELYING UPON PURPORTED ACCORD AND SATISFACTION AS A ·
DEFENSE TO AN ACTION ON A CONTRACT ....... 12-24
POINT 3 - WHERE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A VERDICT THAT TIMELY OBJECTION WAS MADE TO WRITING PURPORTED TO BE CONTRACT AND ELEMENTS
OF ESTOPPEL WERE NOT IN EVIDENCE, IT
WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR A
PARTY RELYING UPON ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT
THE CONTRACT OF THE OTHER P ARTY. ____________ 24-26
CONCLUSION ------------------------------------------------------------------------------26-27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX- (Continued)
Page
CASES CITED

1

.Ashton v. Skeen (1935), 39 ·Pac. 2nd 1073, 85 Utah 489________

16

Bell v. tTones (1941), 110 P.ac. 2nd 327, 100 Utah 87................

16

Benites v. IIampton (1884), 3 Utah 369 .... ---····--·-·----·~--~~-~----·-·-

·5

Browning v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S. (1937),
72 Pac. 2nd 1060, 94 Utah 352............................................

15

Burraston v. First National Bank of Nephi (1900),
22 Utah 328 -·-···-····-----------------·····------·-~-----···················-···---·-'
California Bean Growers Assoc. v. Rindge Land and Navigation Co. (Cal. 1926), 248 Pac. 658, 47 A.L.R. 904 .... ~---

18

Eagle Lumbe;r Co. v. Burton Lumber Co. (1923), 62 Utah 491 ·

9

Wm. F. Godbe v. Brigham Young, 1 Utah 55............................

4

Hansen v. Fresno Jersey Farm Dairy Co. (Cal. 1934),
31 Pac. 2nd 359 ............. --···-···-···-··--·----·----···----·--···········-·······

19

Ingram v. Sauset et al (St.l:p. Ct. Wash., 1922), 209 Pac. 699..

23

Kruger v. Geer, (Sup. Ct. of N.Y., App. Term 1899),
56 N.Y. Supp. 1015 ................ ~-----··-·-·--··········-·-··-·······-·········-

22

Long v. New England Securities Co. (1927), 297 S. W. 715..

23

Ralph A. Badger and Co. v. Fidelity Building and
Loan Association (1938), 75 Pac. 2nd 669, 94 Utah 97........

14

Salt Lake Engineering Works v. Utah Concrete Pipe Co.
(1916), 49 Utah 53 .......... ~················-······-·····-········-··············

9

Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co. (1937), 94 Utah 532,
· 64 Pac. 2nd 351. .. ~---·--------·--·---··--······---·------··--··--··--··-·······----·

15

Wallace v. Crawford (Cal., 1937), 69 Pac. 2nd 455..................

19

6

TEXTS CITED
1 Am. Jur., Sec. 24; pp. 225-6 ............ ----~---·--·---·--·······-··--··---------·

21

-34 A.L.·R. 105~-----···············-···--····-··--··--·-·······--·-····~---····················
1 California Jurisprudence, Sec. 10, p. 134................................

24
20

1 C.J .S., Sec. 37, p. 715·--····-·········-············------------------·---·-----------

9

1 C.J.S., Sec. 65, p. 75'4··············---------··---·-··---·······-··--··-···········--·

10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

R. M. SCOVILLE,

. Appellant,
Case No.

-vs.-

7824

KELLOGG SALES COM:P ANY,

Respondent.·

PRELIMINARY ·sTATEMENT
The first and second ground stated by the Company
for a directed verdict are general and in ~ubstance state
only that the plaintiff failed to prove a pr!ma
facie case;
.
and that a verdict of no cause of action should be granted.
The first two grounds are necessarily. included in the
third ground or conversely the third ground merely lends
grounds. The .tr~al_ j~_dg~
specification to the fi:rst
granted a motion to strike parole evidence as being in
violation of the 1948-1949 \\r-ritings. The trial judge then
.

.

two
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directed a verdict of no cause of action without specifying
grounds for the verdict. The granting of the motion to
strike the evidence in effect held that the 1949 writing set
out the contract of Mr. Sco:ville and the Company. It follows that the affirmative defenses were not ruled upon.
However, as the Company has raised the questions of the
. affirmative defenses in its brief, the lack of merit in the
· Company's defenses will be po~inted out in the argument
to follow.

I.
WHERE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUBSTANTIATE A VERDICT THAT TIMELY OBJECTION
WAS MADE TO AN ACCOUNT AND THE REBUTTAL OF
ANY PRESUMPTION OF ACCURACY OF AN ACCOUNT IT
WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR A PARTY RELYING ON AN ACCOUNT STATED AS A DEFENSE TO AN
ACTION ON A CONTRACT.

II.
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PAYMENT
OF AN AMOUNT ADMITTED TO BE DUE WAS MADE UPON
THE CONDITION THAT ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH PAYMENT SHOULD BE IN FULL SATISFACTION OF ALL
CLAIMS, IT WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE
PARTY RELYING UPON PURPORTED ACCORD AND SATISFACTION AS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTION ON A CONTRACT.

III.
WHERE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A VERDICT THAT TIMELY OBJECTION WAS MADE
TO WRITING PURPORTED TO BE CONTRACT, AND ELEMENTS OF ESTOPPEL WERE NOT IN EVIDENCE, IT WAS
ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR A PARTY RELYING
UPON ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT THE CONTRACT OF THE
OTHER PARTY.
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I.
WHERE THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUBST.ANTIATE A VERDICT THAT TIMELY OBJECTION
\VAS ::\IADE TO AN ACCOUNT AND THE REBUTTAL OF
ANY PRESUl\IPTION OF ACCURACY OF AN ACCOUNT IT
WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR A PARTY RELYING ON AN ACCOUNT STATED AS A DEFENSE TO AN
ACTION ON ...-\ CONTRACT.
~Ir.

Scoville testified as to protests made as to the
1949 writing (R. 28, 61, 62, 71, and 72). Such protests
were made to nir. vVilliams and to Mr. Borswn. These
protests were made subsequent to th~ 1949 writing. In
January 1950 nir. Borsum stated to Mr. Scoville that
:Jir. Scoville should go along with the 1949 writing. If
Mr. Scoville complained to higher-ups in the comp·any,
Mr. Borsum, Mr. Scoville, and Mr. Williams would all
lose their jobs. On January 30, 1950, the Company sent
a check accompanied with a statement which statement
reflected a sum equal to the sum stated on the check and
setting out the word "Bonus." This check was returned
to the Company for the purpose of having all withholding
tax taken out which was done. The Company attempts to
rely upon this statement as an account stated upon the
ground that l\Ir. Scoville would not protest such statement for quite some ti1ne. vVhere an account is received
and no protest is made within a reasonable time, a presuinption arises that such account is an agreed account.
This presun1ption of accuracy is rebuttable. The prior
protest of Mr. Scoville, his illness, his fear of losing his
job, and his consideration for the loss of jobs by other
eu1ployees, i.e., Mr. Williams and Mr. Borsum, were all
~

.
)

d
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facts which should have been submitted to the jury for the
purpose of determining whether or not Mr. Scoville made
protest within a reasonable time. The conversations Mr.
Scoville had regarding the $2 per ton credit for 1949, his
protests regarding the 1949 writing, the fact that he was
ill during February and March of 1950, the fear of losing
his job, and the fact that nothing more could be done by
Mr. Scoville other than leave the ~ervice of the company
at .considerable financial loss to him and his age which
would act as a detriment to him in obtaining a new job
should have gone to the jury as evidence of rebuttal as
evidence of accuracy of the account. There was no evidence of actual assent to the 1949 writing. It was error
for the trial court to direct a verdict on the ground that
there was an account stated between Mr. Scoville and the
Company.
In WM. F. GOD·BE v. BRIGHAM YOUNG, 1 Utah
55, the plaintiff advanced goods to the defendant of the
value of $10,020.27. On February 12, 1856, an account
was rendered to the plaintiff by the defendant for said
sum to which the· defendant made no objection. On May
30, 1868, the defendant paid the plaintiff the sum of $5000.
The plaintiff claimed judgment for the balance. The defendant in his answer denied an account stated.
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, and the
defendant appealed. While other grounds were assigned
as error, this honorable court at page 58 states:
'·r:rhe Court was correct in charging the jury
that if the defendant did not object ':vithin a rea.sonable tiine to an account pre sen ted to hin1, his
assent 1nay be prestuned, and 'vill support a.n ac._l
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tion upon an account stated; and also·tha.t, 'If
"~hen an account is rendered no objection is made
to it, it is to be considered liquidated from the time
it is rendered.' ('Vaiden v. ·sherburne, 15 Johns.,
409; Hall v. Morrison, 3 Bosw. 520; Case v. Hotchkiss, 3 Abb. N. S. 381; Hutchinson v. Bank, 48
Barb., 302; Crane v. Hardman, 4 E. D. S·mith, 448;
Bainbridge v. vVilcocks, Baldw., 536-3rd Circ.
Pa.),
The Godbe case was affirmed as to the account stated
and was reversed on a question regarding interest payments and other matters not determinative in this action.
(82 US 250, 15 Wall562).
In BENITE'S v. HAMPTON, (Utah, 1884), 3 Utah ·
369, plaintiff brought an action on an account stated for
goods sold and delivered. Plaintiff at the time of trial
did not establish that the defendant was a party to the· account or grounds upon which the defendant was to be
held· or the time which the defendant held the account
without protest. This honorable court held that it was
correct not to submit the case to the jury. In so holding,
the court set out the rule regarding the failure to p·rotest
an account within a reasonable time.
At page 373, this honorable court stated: (See following).
'~The

effect of an account state·d is to establish
prima facie the a.ccuTacy of the balance found du·e
· without other proof. The burden of proving that
an account is stated or settled is upon the party
making such allegation; but it is not always necessary in proving an account stated to show an actual examination of the items of account or de5
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mands of the respective parties thereto, or that
there has been an express assent or agreement on
the part of the party sought to be held liable upon
an alleged account stated that it is correct. This
may be implied from circumstances. If an account
be presented for payment by one party thereto to
the other, and the other party, upon an examination of it and after a reasonable time has elapsed,
makes no objection to it, it may be legitimately
presumed that he was satisfied with it as presented, and this presumption is so strong that a
suit can be maintained upon the account as an account stated, without proof other than that the account was presented with a demand for payment,
that reasonable time and opportunity have passed
since its presentation for a proper examination
of it, and to make objections to it if there be any:
Lockwood v. Thorne, 11 N.Y. 170. The same rule
applies where a party to an account sends for payment to the other, by mail; if the party to whom it
is sent does not, after a reasonable time has
passed, express any objection to it, his silence unexplained is an implied admission that he has. none,
that the account is correct, and truly thought not
conclusively stated: Terry v. Sickels, 13 Cal. 427.
"But it is not an estoppel; its effect is to establish prima facie the accuracy of balance due
as stated in the account without further proof:
Lockwood v. Thorne, 18 N~Y. 285."

In BURRASTON v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF·
NEPHI,· (Utah, 1900) 22 Utah 328, plaintiff brought an
action to recover a sum of money alleged to be due the
plaintiff on deposits of money made with the defendant
betwe·en 1886 and 1894. Defendant alleged an account
stated. The plaintiff during the period in question made
6
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numerous deposits, issued numerous checks and signed
notes charged against the account. The bank from time
to time sent statements to the plaintiff showing the condition of the accolmt and returning the cancelled checks and
notes 'vhtch "'\vere paid. During the entire period no objections to the account as reflected by the statement were
made; nor did the plaintiff challenge the validity or genuineness of the checks and notes so returned.
After the account "\vas closed and final statem·ent rendered, the plaintiff and one Hague went to the defendant's
place of business for the purpose of examining the ac. count. After such examination, plaintiff made the statenlent to the president of the bank that the account was
"all right." Subsequent to the examination with Hague
the plaintiff returned to the bank with an attorney for the·
purpose of examining the account. After this second
examination, the attorney expressed himself as being
satisfied .with the account and stated th.at it was all right.
The plaintiff made no objection for nearly three years
after he received the itemized account.
At page 337, the court stated :
I

"The record shows that the notes and checks
in question when paid were returned to Burr aston,
many of which were handed to him in person by
the cashier at different times, and others were
trans1nitted to hirn through the mail; and on no
occasion did he rnake any objection to or challenge
the validity of the notes so paid by him or the
checks issued against his account that we~e paid,
eaneelled and sent or handed to him by the bank.
rrhis, coupled with the fact that he received from
time to time statements showing the condition of
r·•

I
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his account while he was doing business with the
bank, to which statements he made no objections
and offered no corrections, together with the further fact that after he ceased doing business with
the bank, he received an itemized statement of all
the different transactions, including those relating
to the notes, he had with the bank, to which statement he made no objection for more than three
years after its receipt by him, we think was; at
least prima facie proof of the execution of the
notes and· the issuing of the checks in question
by Burra.ston. We are of the opinion and so hold
that the books, notes and checks were properly
admitted in evidence.
"Counsel for defendant contend that there
was an account stated between the pa_rties which
completely ended plaintiff's right of action. We
have made a critical examination of the record
and are decidedly of the opinion that the evidence
conclusively showed that there was an account
conflict in the evidence on
stated. There was
this point. In fact the testimony of Burraston
tended to support this theory of the ~se.

no

"Defendant's motion for a non-suit, made at
the conclusion of the testimony for plaintiff, and
after he had rested his case, should have been
granted, as he failed to make out a prima facie
case against the defendant."
In this case the Company attempts to assert failure
to object by Mr. Scoville which at most would give rise
to a presumption of correctness as was held in the Burraston, supra, regarding establishing the correct of the notes
and checks.
Mr. Scoville did not go over his account with the
8
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Company and state it was .. all right" as Burraston stated
in the Burraston case, supra. Mr. Scoville did not go
over the Company's books with his attorney to the satisfaction of the attorney.
There may have been agreement between the parties
as to tonnages, but agreement as to tonnages would not
operat~ to foreclose a question as to the credit per ton as
the settlement of the credit was not within the contemplation of the parties. 'Salt Lake Engineering Works v.
Utah Concrete Pipe Co., (1916) 49 Utah 53, and Eagle
Lumber Co. v. Burton Lumber Co., (1923) 62 Utah 491.
In l C.J.S., secti.on 37, page 715
"Retention for an unreasonable time, without
objection, of a statement of an account rendered
showing the net balance due prima facie shows
assent to its correctness and, therefore, is prima
facie evidence of an account stated. Assent to the
correctness of a statement of accounts is ordinarily ilnplied from failure to object to it within a
reasonable time, and, in the absence of extenuating
circumstances, as shown infra Section 37 b, the ac- ·
count becomes an account stated.
"Failure to object to an account does not, as
against the party to whom it was presented, conclusively establish its character as an 'account
stated, but merely rais~s a presumption to that
effect, and his conduct ther_ein is open to explanation.
'"The presumption of assent to the correctness
of an -acc_ount retained without objection may be
rebutted ·by showing facts inconsistent with it or
tending to negative assent, as by showing that the
party to who1n it was rendered was ill or absent
9
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from home, that he had no opportunity to examine
the account, that he was waiting for a more detailed account vvhich he had requested or which had
been promised him, that he had no knowledge of
his interests in the matters contained in the account, that he expected sho~rtly to see the other
party and make his objections in person, or that
the expected meeting was prevented or delayed by
some unforeseen casualty. So the natural inference to be drawn from an omission to object might .
be rebutted by a showing that the parties were in
litigation with reference to the matter when the
account was rendered or within a short time there·
after, that they had agreed to determine the
amount at a later time, or had agreed expressly
or by course of dealing that no technical defaults
should be insisted upon.
"Failure to object to the statement of an account may be explained by a showing that there
had been an acquiescence in a previous, different
statement involving the same transactions, or that
the parties had already come, to a disagreement
when the account was rendered, as where the party
sought to be charged had protested at his first opportunity and the account was never corrected, or
where there had been a previous dis-claimer of all
liability on the account. So, where previous protests had gone unheeded and nothing more could
be done except break a contract, which would entail great financial risk, failure to make further
protests cannot be interpreted as assent."
In 1 C.J.S., section 65, page 754
"In an action on an account stated questions
of fact should ordinarily be submitted to the jury.
Thus, where a settlen1ent of dates names, and
figures so arranged as not to ·be self-explanatory,

10
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the question· as to whether a particular transaction is included therein is for the jury; but where
it contains no 'vords of doubtful meaning the construction of the stated account is a matte-r of law
for the court.
"Where the facts are undisputed, the question
as to whether an account was stated is for the
court, as where the statement is e·videnced wholly
by correspondence; but where the evidence is conflicting the question must be determined by the
jury under proper instructions.
hUnder the rule that an account rendered and
retained for an unreasonable time without objection becomes an account stated, the authorities .
are in apparent conflict as to whether the question
·of what constitutes a reasonable time should be
determined by the court as a matter of law or by
the jury as a 1natter of fact. In some jurisdictions
it is held that when the facts ·are clear the question of the length of time deemed reasonable is determinable by the court as a matter of law and that
where the evidence is not clear, or conflict app·ears
therein, the facts should be submitted to the jury
under appropriate instructions. In other jurisdictions, however, it is held that \vhat is a reasonable
tin1e, whether the failure to object was for such
length of time as would warrant an inference of
assent, and whether the person to whom an account
is rendered ought sooner to have discovered the
errors therein, are questions of fact for the jury.
"vVhere defendants made their objections to a
person falsely claiming to represent plaintiff, it is
a question of fact whether under the circumstances
any inference of assent could be drawn from his
failure to object to plaintiff."
It is evident that further protest regarding the state11
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ment in question to Mr. Borsum or Mr. Williams would
. he an idle je-sture by him. Mr. Scoville was relegated to
the position of making protests to persons higher in the
. hierarchy of the Company. Protests to the person rendering the statement should be sufficient. In this case it was
enclosed in the letter from Mr. Williams dated January
30, 19.50. There was evidence that protests regarding the
. credits to Mr. Williams account were made. Evidence of
these protests should have gone to the jury for their
consideration. As excuse for any further protest by Mr.
Scoville at the time or subsequent to receipt of any account receive·d by Mr. Scoville.
Evidence of the protests to Williams and Borsum
about the 1949 writing, the illness of Mr. Scoville early in
1950, and the loss of employment by Mr. Scoville should
have gone to jury as evidence or rebuttal of the presumption of accuracy, if any such presumption arose.
It was error· for the trial to direct a verdict for the
Company on the ground of account stated, there being
sufficient evidence to establish that protest was made
·within a reasonable time and sufficient evidence to rebut
any presumption that might have arisen.
II.
WHERE THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT PAYMENT
OF AN AMOUNT ADMITTED TO BE DUE WAS MADE UPON
THE CONDITION THAT ACCEPTANCE OF SUCH PAYMENT SHOULD BE IN FULL SATISFACTION OF ALL
CLAIMS, IT WAS ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR THE
PARTY RELYING UPON PURPORTED ACCORD AND SATISFACTION AS A DEFENSE TO AN ACTION ON A CONTRACT.

Mr. Scoville testified as to protests made about the

12
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1949 'vriting (R. 28, 61, 62, 71, and 72). He also testified
as to a conversation dpring which ~fr. Borsum stated that
he should go along with the 1949 'vriting or that Mr.
&oville, Mr. \'V"illian1s and Mr. Borsum would lose tll.eir
jobs. There was no evidence regarding any conversations
or circumstances showing any intent to settle a disputed
claim. In Januaryl1950, the Company enclosed a check in
a letter stating that the check was "to cover a Bonus for
the year 1949." This check was returned by Mr. Scoville
for the purpose of having withholding taxes deducted.
Another check was sent to him in the sum equal to the
first check less the withholding taxes. ·There is no statement on the check regarding it being in settlemeut of all
the claims Mr. Scoville had against the Company. This
would not establish a defense o£ accord and satisfaction.
The payment of an amount conceded to be due is not sufficient consideration upon which to found a contract of accord and satisfaction. The payment of a sum conceded to
be due upon the consideration that, if accepted it shall
be in full settlement of the claim, may be sufficient consideration, but no such condition was made. The conversations, the check or the statement setting out ,a figure as
''Bonus" equal to the amount of the first check do not in
anyway establish a condition.
The last check was enclose·d in a letter stating "Attached find check in the amount of $1,026.88 rep-resenting
balance due on your Bonus for 1949." The check itself did
not have any condition as to acceptance written on it.
The mere statement "balance due on your Bonus for
.1949" is not
a statement of condit~on that the. check is
.
,

...

.

'
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tendered upon the condition that, if accepted, such acceptance is in full settlement of all claims for bonus for the
year 1949. The statement is more indicative of an intent
to show that such sum represents the credits in favor of
Mr. 'Scoville in his account and makes no indication of
condition of settlement.
There .is no evidence upon which a contract of accord
and satisfaction could be founded.
The trial court having directed a verdict, the facts
must be considered and applied in the most favorable
light to the plaintiff's cause of action.
In RALPH A. BADGER & CO. v. FIDELITY
BUILDING & LOAN ASS'N., (Utah, 1938) 75 Pac. 2nd.
669, 94 Utah 97, the court at page 676 quotes with ap. proval1 Am. Jur. page 217, section 4, that: ·
"The discharge of claims by way of Accord
and Satisfaction is dependent upon a contract express or implied; and· it follows that the essentials
necessary to valid con tracts generally must be
present in a contract of Accord and Satisfaction.
Therefore, the following elements are essential:
(1) a proper subject matter, (2) competent parties, ( 3) an assent or n1eeting of the minds of the
parties, and (4) a consideration.
"To the same effect see 1 C.J.S., Accord and
Satisfaction, page 469, section 3 (a). This court
in a number of cases has followed the rule thus
enunciated: SMOOT v. CHECKETTS, 41 Utah
211, 125 P. 412, Ann. Cas. 1915c,- 1113; ROHWER
v. BURRELL, 42 Utah 510, 134 P. 573; GRAY v.
BULLEN, 50 Utah 270, 167 P. 683; ASHTON v.
SKEEN, 85 Utah 489, 39 P. 2d 1073; STJLLIVAN
v. BENEFICIAL LIFE INS. CO., Utah, 64 P. 2d
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351; BROWNING v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR. SOC. OF U.S·., Utah, 72 P. 2d 1060, 1068.
In the case last cited 've said: 'An Accord is an
agreement between parties, one to give or perfornl, the other to receive or accept, such agreed
payment or perfor1nance in satisfaction of a claim.
The '"satisfaction" is the consummation of such
agreement. There n1ust be consideration for the
agreement. Settlement of an unliquidated or disputed clai1n "There the parties are apart in good
faith presents such consideration. Where the claim
is definite and no dispute but an admittance of its
owing, the agreen1ent to take a lesser amount even
followed by satisfaction is not good unless attended by some consideration."
In SULLIVAN v. BENEFICIAL LIFE INS.URANCE C01IP ANY, (Utah, 1937), 94 Utah 532, 64 Pac.
2nd. 351, the defendant asserted accord and satisfaction
was established by a letter returning a premium and the
check enclosed therewith in which this court held that
there is nothing in the correspondence or the check itself
or in the attitude of the ·defendant company to show any
intent or attempt to settle a disputed claim.
In BROWNING v. EQUITABLE LIFE ASSUR.
SOC. OF THE U.S. (Utah, 1937), 72 Pac. 2nd. 1060, 94
Utah 532, plaintiff brought an action to recover the difference between payments made unde·r an insurance
policy for partial and total disabilities which were paid
in full by the defendant. Defendant relied upon the accord and satisfaction as a defense. This honorable court
held there was no accord and satisfaction, that payment
by the company was merely the payment' of an amouut
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less than was o~ed, there being no dispute as to the
amount of the claim. That the plaintiff's claim was
merely for less than was actually due.
In BELL v. JONES (Utah, 1941), 110 Pac. 2nd. 327,
100 Utah 87, where an agreement provided that ·$150 be
accep~eq. "in full satisfaction of the existing obligation of
$400." And ~here was nothing stated that the $400 obligation was the only obligation existing between the parties.
This honorable court held there was no indication of an
intent to release any other obligation due upon the payment of $150 other than the payment of the obligation
of $400.
In AS.HTON v. SKEEN et al, (Utah, 1935), 39 Pac.
2rid. 1073, 85 Utah 489, the matter was disposed of on
grounds that acc6rd and satisfaction did not apply be,cause. of_ tl?-e atto~ney-client relationship. The ·court
through l1:r. Justice Wade stated at page 1077 regarding
cases set out in the opinion in that case :
'"l.,hese cases generally lay down the rule that,
-where there is an unliql.1idated claim or a bona
fide dispute, the tender of a sum less than clairued,
on -condition that, if accepted, it will be in full
satisfaction of the greater claim, arnounts to an
Accord and Satisfaction. A nurnber of these cases
hold that, \vhere a personal check is tendered on
the condition) if cashed, it will be in full satisfaction of the disputed clairn, and the party receiving
it cashes it and at the san1e time or later notifies
the sender that it is only applied on account, it can
only be accepted on the saine conditions as it is
tendered, and, as a rnatter of law, amounts to an
_ accord ~nd_ s~tisfaction." (Italics _added.) _
The Company raised the d-efense 0f accord and satis-
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faction. The Company had the burden of establishing all
of the elements of a contract of accord and satisfaction.
As the case was disp·osed of upon a 1notion for a directed
verdict all of the evidence must be considered and ap·plied
in the most favorable light to the plaintiff and if there is
any substantial evidence upon which the jury could find
for the plaintiff under the pleadings the trial court must
submit the issue to the jury and cannot direct a verdict.
Under the rule as announced by this honorable court,
the facts must establish (1) that the claim was unliquidated or that a bona fide dispute existed between Mr.
Scoville and the company; (2) that the Company agree to
give in payment of the claim and that Mr. Scoville agree
to accept a payment in satisfaction of the claim; (3) that
such payment was made and accepted in satisfaction of
the claim.
In this case there was no accord and satisfaction
bet,veen Mr. Scoville and the Company. There is no evidence in the record which would substantiate an agreement of payment and the acceptance of that payment as
being in full satisfaction of Mr. Scoville's claim for
credits due his account computed at the rate of $2 per
ton feed sold. Nor is there any evidence that there was
any pa:yinent made upon the condition that it be accepted
as full satisfaction of Mr. Scoville's claim.
The Company attempts to rely upon rules regarding
the tending of payment of an amount conceded to be due
upon the condition that if accepted the payment would be
in full satisfaction of all of the claims of Mr. Sco:ville.
Such a condition ~jd not exist. There is no evidence to

17
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

support such a theory. There is no evidence in the record
that the payments made to Mr. Scoville were made upon
a condition that, if accepted, such payments would operate· a.s a satisfaction of any claim that Mr. 'Scoville
might have. Such payments were made under statements
and circumstances indicating that they were mere payments of amounts conceded to be due. Mr. Scoville. Such
payments will not establish accord and satisfaction.
The Company relies upon the case of CALIFORNIA
BEAN GROWERS' ASSOCIATION v. RINDGE LAND
& NAVIGATION COMPANY, 248 Pac. 658, 47 A.L.R.
904, (Cal., 1926). The wording in the letters relied upon
to establish an accord and satisfaction read as follows:
"We have pleasure in enclosing herewith our
check No. 2525 for $22,744.73 representing a final
settlement of the 1918 account, with the exception
of two small lots which remain unsold; these were
enumerated on a statement which we recently for~
warded to you."
and:
"This amount represents the final settlement
on your 1918 account."
The words used in the letters sent by the Company in
this .case do not indicate the settlement of any claim as
the words used in the California Bean Growers'· case,
Supra. The words used in the letter of January 30, 1950,
were "Please find enclosed our check in the amount of
$3544.35 to cover Bonus for the year 1949."
The words used in the letter of April 25, 1950, sent
by Mr. Borsum are "Attached find check in the amount
of $1,026.88 representing balance ~ue on your bonus fo1:
.18
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1949. ~, These 'Yords do not indicate that there is a settlement of any claim; nor is there any testimony which
would even indicate that at the time of the letters it was
'vithin the conten1plation of the parties that a settlement
or compromise of a claim 'vas intended.
The checks received and endorsed by Mr. Scoville
did not indicate that they were sent in settlement of a
claim.
The Company in its brief states that in WALLACE
v. CRAWFORD, 69 Pac. 2nd. 455 (Cal., 1937), "Where an
accounting on rice payments was sent and received and
showed the amount sold to defendant by plaintiff together
with a check for that amount.· It was held that such constituted an account stated and accord and satisfaction:"
(Respondent's Brief page 37).
Such statement is incorrect. In that case the court
at page 461 said :
· "Since the court failed to adopt findings regarding the question of a stated account and with
respect to the doctrine of accord and satisfaction,
"\Ve shall not attempt to determine whether the conduct of the parties under all the circumstances of
this case deterrninese this action adversely to the
appellant on those issues. We are of the opinion
it is unnecessary to do so."
In HANSEN v. F'RESNO JER'SEY FARM DAIRY
CO., 31 Pac. 2nd. 359, plaintiff and defendant entered
into an agreement under ~he terms of which the plaintiff
was to sell and deliver to the defendant so many gallons
of milk per day at an agreed price. The defendant, each
n1onth sent to the plaintiff a statement of milk delivered
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during the preceding month acco1npanied by a chech
covering the amount shown to be due by the statement,
but which amount was subject to certain deductions made
by the defendant. The amount in the statement was less
than the agreed price and allowable deductions. The
plaintiff retained the proceeds from the checks. Plaintiff
protested the reductions to the defendant and Dairymans
League. The defendant alleged an account stated upon
each of the accounts defendant had rendered and paid to
the plain tiff of the con tract.
Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of California held
that in view of the protest made by the plaintiff and in
view of the contractual relationship between the parties
and the requirement for monthly accounts and payments
such court could not say that the trial court'was not justified in concluding that there was no assent on the part of
the plaintiff to the accuracy of the account. The court
held that assuming the question in accord and satisfaction was raised. This court did not feel justified in disturbing the trial court's conclusion that there was no
accord and satisfaction.
In 1 California Juris prudence p. 134, section 10, it is
said:
"The great weight· of authority in American
courts undoubtedly supports the rule that 'vhere
the amount due is in dispute and a check for an
arnount less than that clairned is sent to the creditor with a statement that it is sent in full satisfac. tion of the clairn, and the tender is accornplished
by such acts or decla.ra.tions as amount to a condition tha.t if the check is accepted at all it is accepted in full satisfaction of the disputed rlain1,
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and the creditor so understands, its acceptance by
the creditor constitutes an accord and satisfaction,
even though the creditor states at the time that the·
an1ount tendered is not accepted in full satisfaction." (Italics added.)
In 1 Am. Jur., pp. 225-6, section 24 of the chapter
on Accord and satisfaction, it is said :
"The creditor to whom a check is sent or other
remittance made as payment in full has the <>'ption
either of accepting it on the conditions on which it
is sent, or of rejecting it. When a cla.im is in disput(}, and the debtor sends to his creditor a check
or other remittance which he clea.rly states is in
full pay1n ent of the claim and the creditor accepts
the rentittance or collects the check without objection it is generally recognized that this constitutes
a good accord and satisfaction. The moment the
creditor endorses and collects the check, with
knowle_dge that it was oIf ered only upon condition,
he thereby agrees to the condition and is estopped
from denying such agreement. It is then that the
minds of the parties meet and the contract of accord and satisfaction becomes complete. It is not
necessary that it be shown that the creditor knows
the legal ·effect of his acceptance of the· check,
as the mere acceptance will be regarded as assent." (Italics added.)
It should be noted that according to the above authorities the payment must be sent to the creditor with
a statement that it is sent in "full satisfaction of the
clahn" or that such tender of payment must be accomplished by such actions or declarations as to amount, to
a condition that if the check is accepted it is accepted in
full satisfaction and that the creditor must so understand
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that the acceptance by him constitutes an accord and
satisfaction. These conditions do not exist in this case.
The words used by the Company do not establish that
they are tendered in full satisfaction by all the claims of
Mr. S.coville against the Company. The words of condition cannot be read into the letters in which the checks
were transmitted, and there was no statement of condition set out on the checks.
In KRUGER v. GEER, (Supreme Court of New
York, Appellate Term, 1899), 56 N.Y. Supp. 1015, plaintiff brought an action to recover balance due on collection of judgment. Defendant as attorney for the plaintiff collected a judgment of which the defendant was
admittedly entitled to $372.62. Defendant sent plaintiff
$168.86, retaining the balance for services rendered, as
he claims, in other matters. Accompanying the check
was a receipted statement ·and a letter. The material
part of the letter stated: "Enclosed you/will find a statement of account, my receipted bill for professional services since our last settlement, and a check for $166.86,
being the balance due you." The check did not make any
declaration, or even indication, that it was intended as
full settlement. Upon receipt of the letter the plaintiff
complained to the defendant. The testimony was conflict.ing a.s to~whether the defendant stated to the plaintiff that
he could retain the check as full settlement or return it to
the defendant at the tin1e the plaintiff complained to the
defendant. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff and
defendant appealed the Supreme Court of New York
held that the verdict of the jury resolved the conflicting
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testimony, and unless an implied agreement can be inferred from the conceded facts, there was no accord and
satisfaction. At page 1016 et seq the Court said:
"The only fart fro1n which such an inference
could be dra\Yn is -the retention by the plaintiff of
the receipted staten1ent, and of a cheek which was
not coupled \Yith any condition that it should be
received in full pa~'Jnent. That isolated fact is insufficient to meet the requiren1ents of an accord,
and, in connection \vith the surrounding circumstances, strips the defense of all merit."
In INGR~L\.~I v. SAUSET et al, (Supreme Court of
Washington, 1922), 209 Pac. 699, defendant mailed p·urported statement to the plaintiff which was itemized and
set out the words "Balance due- $232.16." and enclosed
a check in the sum admitted by the statement to be due.
Plaintiff testified that he had the idea from the statement
that the defendant intended that the check should be payment in full. The Supreme Court of Washington held that
whatever the intention was the check was not offered ih
full satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. Though the defendant hoped it would be so accepted.
In LONG v. NEW ENGLAND SECURITIES· CO.,
'Springfield Court of Appeals, 1927, 297 SW 715, the
plaintiff brought an action to recover the balance due
on a commission having received checks enclosed in a
letter stating: "And we enclose herewith check $225 and
$360, respectively, in payment of your commission." The
court held the letter and checks did not constitute an offer
in full satisfaction of the claim of the creditor.
In 34 A.L.R. at page 1052, the editors state:
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"When the assent of the creditor is sought to
be inferred from the acceptance of a less sum than
that claimed to be due, the fact that such amount
is offered irn full discharge of the whole claim must
have been com.municated to the cred.itor in some
unmistakable manner."
Mere payment of an amount admittedly due on a
claim for a greater sum is not sufficient consideration
for a contract of accord and satisfaction of the greater
claim. As set out by the foregoing authorities the payment of the amount admittedly due must be made upon
the condition that payment and the acceptance of such
payment is in full satisfaction of the claim. Such condition must be communicated to the person to whom tender
is made in some unmistakable manner. The Company did
not tender any payments. upon condition that acceptance
be made as satisfaction of Mr. Scoville's entire claim.
Mere use of the terms "balance due," or a check accompanie:d by a statement setting out a sum. equal to that of
a check reciting that the sum is "Bonus" is not enough.
It would be .error for the trial court to direct a ve-rdict for the Company on the ground that there was an accord and satisfaction.
III.
I

WI-IERE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A VERDICT THAT TIMELY OBJECTION WAS MADE
TO WRITING PURPORTED_ TO BE CONTRACT,, AND ELEME!~TS OF ESTOPPEL WERE NOT IN EVIDENCE, IT WAS
ERROR TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR A PARTY RELYING
UPON ESTOPPEL TO ASSERT THE CONTRACT OF THE
OTI-IER PARTY.

The primary duty of Mr. Scoville was the sale of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

feed sold by the Con1pany. The great bulk of the feed sold
by Mr. Scoville "\Vas sold under a turkey finance program ..
The feed was sold under contracts entered into by the
Company and the turkey raisers. The contracts were
entered into and approved by the Company by July 1,
1949. The sales of the Company had been contracted for
and the primary purpose of Mr. Scoville's employment
had been served. During the latter part of July or early
August the Company attempts to assert a writing as
the contract bet,veen Mr. Scoville and the Company.
There is sufficient evidence to sustain a verdict that
Mr. Scoville protested to Mr. Williams who signed the
Bulletin setting out the bonus plan for 1948, and to Mr.
Borsum who signed the writing upon which the Company
relies to establish a contract for the year 1949.
The last protest to Mr. Williams or Mr. Borsum was
made on January 10, 1950. It is apparent that further
protest to these gentlemen would he futile. At this point
in so far as the year 1949 is concerned a debtor creditor
relationship existed. It cannot be said that there was a
further continuance of any agreement of the year of 1949.
At this point Mr. Scoville was entitled to rely upon his
re1nedies as a creditor.
There was sufficient evidence to support a verdict
that timely objection was made, tha.t there was no continuation of performance under the purported contract
between Mr. Scoville and the Company.
There is no evidence, in fact every fact is to the contrary, that there was an acceptance of benefits and an
attempt to avoid the obligations under the purported
contract.
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Nor is there any evidence that there was any nlisrep.
resentation by Mr. Scoville upon which the Company
relied to their detriment.
It was error for the trial court to direct a verdict for
the Company on the ground that there was an estoppel.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Scoville's theory of the case, that a contract implied in fact and in law arose in January, 1949, to the effect that a $2.00 per ton of feed sold be c~edited to his account during the year 1949, should have gone to the jury.
There was sufficient evidence, when considered in the
most favorable light for Mr. Scoville to require submission of the case to the jury.
In addition to the evidence regarding an implied contract in fact there was a presumption giving rise to a contract providing for $2.00 per ton of feed sold for the year,
1949. The plan was based on annual production. His
employment under the Company's plan was on a yearly
basis. The continuation of Mr. 'Scoville in his employment in law and in fact created a new contract providing
for the $2.00 per ton of feed sold credited to his account.
There is no merit to the claim of the Company that
they have affirmative defenses as a matter of la\v.
There was sufficient evidence upon which to sustain
a verdict by the jury that objection to the purported account rendered by the Cornpany was made by Mr. Scoville within a reasonable time. There was also sufficient
evidence to sustain a verdict by the jury that if objection
was not made within a reasonable ti1ne, the presun1ption
of accuracy of the account 'Yas rebutted.
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There is no evidence that payment by the Company
of 1949 bonus checks were made upon the condition that
acceptance would be· in full satisfaction of Mr. Scoville's
claim in support of the Company's theory of accord and
satisfaction.
The case is not a proper case for -the application
of the concept of estoppel. Protest regarding the 1949
writing was made and there was no contradiction of the
evidence. The Company did not change its position to
its detriment. There is no evidence of misrepresentation
or reliance. The Company attempted to foist a writing
upon ~Ir. Scoville as being the agreement of the parties.
Such writing was not the contract of the parties. Mr. Scoville is not estopped to assert the true agreement of the
parties.
Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CALLISTER, JR.
REESE C. ANDERSON
Attorneys for Appellant
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